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Abstract
We study environments with sticky prices, wages or portfolios where it is
feasible and optimal to use monetary policy to replicate the allocation under
full ﬂexibility. In these environments the optimal policy does not depend
on the scope of the frictions. In this sense, the strength of the monetary
transmission mechanism is irrelevant for the conduct of monetary policy.
So, asymmetries in the strength of the transmission mechanisms do not
impose a cost on a common policy.
∗We thank Chuck Carlstrom, Tim Fuerst, Jordi Gali and Marvin Goodfriend, for helpful
discussions, as well as participants at seminars where this work was presented.
†Corresponding author: Banco de Portugal, DEE, R. Francisco Ribeiro, n. 2, 1150 Lisbon,
Portugal, Tel. # 351-21-3128385, mihcarvalho@bportugal.pt1. Introduction
How should monetary policy be conducted in response to shocks in the economy?
How relevant is the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, for the conduct
of this optimal policy? How costly can a single monetary policy be when countries
don’t share a single monetary transmission mechanism? In this paper we analyze
a commonly used economic environment where it is possible to obtain answers to
these policy questions.
Our model economy is a standard dynamic general equilibrium model where
the government must ﬁnance exogenous expenditures with distortionary taxation.
We consider three types of restrictions on the agents choices that correspond to
three types of transmission mechanisms. Agents may be restricted in the setting
of prices, wages, or in the choice of portfolio composition. The severity of these
restrictions determines the strength of the transmission mechanism.
One example of a transmission mechanism is when monopolistic competitive
ﬁrms are restricted to set the prices before observing the shocks. With this price
stickiness, an unanticipated monetary injection can raise production, lowering the
mark-ups and thus inducing a more eﬃcient scale of production. This increase
in economic activity is more pronounced the higher is the fraction of ﬁrms that
set the prices in advance, i.e. the more potent is the monetary transmission.1
I f ,i n s t e a d ,p r i c e sa r ep e r f e c t l yﬂexible but portfolio choices are not, a diﬀerent
source of non-neutrality of money arises. This is identiﬁed in the literature as lim-
ited participation or market segmentation models, as in Lucas (1990) and Fuerst
(1992). The households choose their portfolios before observing the shocks, which
g i v e sr i s et ot h el i q u i d i t ye ﬀects of monetary policy. As the share of households
that are unable to adjust the portfolios increases, the impact of the monetary
policy is also larger.
Even though monetary policy can have beneﬁcial eﬀects, because of the inef-
ﬁcient scale of production with monopolistic competition, it is not possible to use
this policy systematically to take advantage of these eﬀects. However, there is still
a role for stabilization policy. Policy can be used in response to technological or
other shocks so that the negative welfare eﬀects of the nominal rigidities, together
with the other distortions in the economy, are minimized.
Optimal policy in environments like these has been extensively studied in re-
cent literature. In this paper we directly apply the results of Correia, Nicolini and
1This is shown, for example, in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) and Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan (1996).
2Teles (2002) and Adao, Correia and Teles (2001) on optimal ﬁscal and monetary
policy in economies with nominal rigidities on the setting of prices or choice of
portfolios. They obtain that it is optimal to use policy to replicate the optimal
allocations under full ﬂexibility.
At ﬁrst sight one could think that economies with diﬀerent degrees of mone-
tary transmission should also follow diﬀerent monetary policy rules. This is the
conventional wisdom, that there is a cost for economies with diﬀerent transmission
mechanisms of following a common monetary policy. This is not necessarily the
case. Monetary shocks have larger eﬀects, the larger is the extent of the frictions.
However, the impact of other types of shocks is also aﬀected by the extent of
t h ef r i c t i o n s .I tt u r n so u tt h a to p t i m a lm o n e t a r yp o l i c yi st h es a m ei nr e s p o n s e
to common shocks, irrespective of the strength of the transmission mechanism.
The strength of the monetary transmission mechanism is, thus, irrelevant for the
conduct of the optimal monetary policy. This is the main result of the paper.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we analyze an economy where
prices and wages are perfectly ﬂexible and there are no portfolio restrictions. We
show that there are policies such that one of the nominal variables, prices, wages,
or money holdings do not change with the history of shocks. Thus, with adequate
ﬁscal and monetary policy it is possible to replicate the behavior of the full ﬂexible
economy, when, instead there is either price, wage or portfolio stickiness. Since in
Adao, Correia and Teles (2001) and Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2001) it is shown
that it is optimal to replicate the ﬂexible allocation, the results in sections 3 follow
directly. We assert that the optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy is independent of
the degree of one type of stickiness. Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
2. An economy with ﬂexible prices, wages and portfolio
choices
Our model economy is very similar to the one in Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1997). The economy consists of a large number of identical households, a
continuum of ﬁrms, each producing a distinct good indexed by i ∈ [0,1], ﬁnancial
intermediaries and a government. The period t vector of productivity and gov-
ernment expenditure shocks is denoted by st =[ At,G t] ∈ St, and the history of
these shocks up to period t (or state at t), (s0,s 1,...,st), is denoted by st ∈ St.
The initial realization s0 is given. To simplify the exposition, we assume that the
history of shocks has a discrete distribution. The conditional probability of shocks
st given the history st−1 is denoted by Pr(st|st−1).
32.1. The households









where β is a discount factor, Lt =1− Nt, where Nt is the level of labor and








, θ>1. Households start
period t with wealth Wt.A tt h es t a r to fp e r i o dt households decide to hold money
balances, Mh
t , decide to make deposits at the ﬁnancial intermediaries, Bh
t , that
pay RtBh
t at the beginning of period t +1 , and decide to buy Zh
t+1 units of state
contingent nominal securities, that cost zt+1 Pr(st+1|st) and pay one unit of money
at the beginning of period t +1in a particular state. Thus, in the beginning of







t+1zt+1 ≤ Wt. (2.2)
Labor is paid in the beginning of the period in the form of money, WtNt, where
Wt is the net nominal wage rate. The purchases of consumption goods have to be




t + WtNt (2.3)
where Pit is the price of ﬁnal good i. At the end of the period, the households
receive the proﬁts net of taxes, (1−τπ
t )Πit. Thus, the nominal wealth households
























t ,Πit,R t,z t+1 Pr(st+1|st)}∞
t=0 that maximize (2.1) satisfying (2.2),











































,θ>1, where git is the government consumption of good







































































The households, at the beginning of the period t,d e p o s i tBh
t with the ﬁnancial
intermediary. The gross interest rate on these deposits is Rt, received at the
beginning of period t +1 .T h eﬁnancial intermediary lends B
f
it to the ﬁrms. The
return on these loans is also Rt, since the intermediary behaves competitively
and makes zero proﬁts. In addition the intermediary buys state contingent assets
EtZb




The technology used by ﬁrms is linear in labor, the only production input. The
ﬁrms need to borrow the net wage bill from the ﬁnancial intermediaries as they
must pay wages at the beginning of the period. At the beginning of period t, ﬁrm
i gets loans, B
f
it, from the intermediary and decides to hold M
f
it of cash balances.





t=0, taking as given the
sequence {Yt,P t,W t,τn






nit − (Rt − 1)B
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The ﬁrms set the common price equal to a constant mark-up over marginal
cost,






















































An equilibrium in this environment is an allocation, prices, and a government
policy such that: (i) given the prices and the government policy, the allocation
solves the problems of the households, ﬁrms and ﬁnancial intermediary; and (ii)
the allocation satisﬁes the market clearing conditions.
The government chooses the policy associated with the equilibrium allocation
that gives the highest value of welfare, i.e. solves the standard Ramsey problem.2






t=0 that maximizes utility (2.1) subject to the feasibility
condition,
Ct ≤ AtNt − Gt. (2.10)
and an implementability condition that summarizes all the competitive equilib-
rium conditions. The optimal policy is such that τπ
t =1 , since the tax on proﬁts





t=0 be the Ramsey allocation. Then we obtain the optimal dis-
tortion γ∗
t in each period from condition
uL (t)
uC (t)





(1 + (Rt − 1)(1 − τn
t ))
, (2.11)
that combines the intra-temporal condition, (2.5) and the pricing condition, (2.9).
The sequences of interest rates and taxes rates {Rt,τn
t }
∞
t=0 are not uniquely de-
termined.
The nominal variables, Pt,W t, and Mh
t , are also not uniquely determined. The


































L e tt h e r eb eo n es t a t ea td a t e0a n dΦt states at date t ≥ 1. Consider a given
sequence for {Rt}
∞
t=0 . At t =0 , there is one equation (2.12) and one equation
2See Ramsey (1927).
7(2.14) to determine the three variables P0,W 0, and Mh
0 .A t t ≥ 1 there are Φt
equations (2.12), Φt equations (2.14), and Φt−1 equations (2.13) to determine 3Φt
variables. There are, thus, Φt − Φt−1 degrees of freedom in the determination of
the nominal variables Pt,W t, and Mh
t , t ≥ 0,w i t hΦ−1 =0 . This result is stated
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. Given a sequence {γ∗
t,R t}
∞
t=0 the optimal equilibrium alloca-
tion is determined but there is nominal indeterminacy. There are multiple se-




t=0, associated with that real allocation. The degrees of freedom are
Φt − Φt−1 for each t ≥ 0.
This indeterminacy result is related to the one in Sargent and Wallace (1975),
where it is shown that prices are indeterminate when the monetary authority
picks the interest rates. This indeterminacy result was conﬁrmed by Lucas and
Stokey (1983) in a dynamic general equilibrium model where the need to ﬁnance
exogenous government expenditures with distortionary taxes is explicit.3
The result in Proposition 2.1. implies that there are monetary policies such
that one of the three nominal variables does not depend on the contemporane-
ous shocks. A related point was made by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) in an
environment where prices are set in advance by a fraction of ﬁrms.
S i n c ei nt h i se n v i r o n m e n tt h eg o v e r n m e n tc a nf r e e l yc h o o s et h ep a t ho fi n t e r -
est rates provided that the labor income tax is adjusted to satisfy γt = γ∗
t,t h e r ea r e






using the equations above, (2.12), (2.13) and (2.14). The total degrees of freedom






t=0 such that one of the three nominal variables, prices,
wages or households money holdings, does not depend on the state. It is also
straightforward to show that, in general, the policy that achieves state indepen-
dence of each one of the nominal variables is a diﬀerent one. This means that, in
general, it is not possible to achieve state independence of more than one of the
nominal variables. These results are stated in the following proposition:




t=0 c a nb ec h o s e ni ns u c h






t=0 does not depend on the state and




3See also Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) and Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2003).
83. Transmission mechanisms
We have analyzed so far an economy without frictions. As will become clear, the
results in the ﬂexible economy can be directly applied to establish the main point
of this paper, that the strength of the transmission mechanism is irrelevant for the
conduct of optimal policy. We proceed in the following way: We consider three
types of frictions, on the decision of prices, wages and portfolios. Each of these
frictions is associated with a transmission mechanism. The strength of a particular
monetary transmission mechanism depends on the extent of the friction, measured
by the fraction of agents that are able to choose either prices, wages or portfolios
contemporaneously. We use the results in the literature on optimal ﬁscal and
monetary policy in economies with sticky prices and sticky portfolios, according
to which, when ﬁscal and monetary policy is conducted jointly it is feasible and
optimal to replicate the optimal allocation in the ﬂexible environment. Finally,
we apply the results in the previous section to show that the policies that replicate
the allocations in the ﬂexible economy are the same independently of the extent
of the friction.
The literature has studied the second best optimal government policy when
there is one of the three types of frictions, on prices, wages or portfolios. Adao,
Correia and Teles (2003) characterize optimal monetary policy in an economy with
prices set in advance and show that in general it is not optimal to replicate the
allocation under ﬂexible prices. Instead, when both ﬁscal and monetary policy
are chosen jointly the result is overturned and it is always optimal to replicate
the ﬂexible price allocation. This is shown in Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2002).
It is straightforward to extend those results to an environment with sticky wages.
The result is conﬁrmed in an environment where portfolios are set in advance by
Adao, Correia and Teles (2001). The following proposition states these results.
Proposition 3.1. In the presence of only one rigidity, in prices, wages, or port-
folios, it is optimal to replicate the Ramsey solution of the ﬂexible economy.
Now we show the main result of the paper, that the strength of the transmission
mechanism is irrelevant for the conduct of optimal policy. We use the result
in Proposition 3.1, that the Ramsey solution of the ﬂexible economy should be
replicated and Proposition 2.2, stating that this allocation can be achieved with
a policy such that the path for one of the nominal variables, price, wages or
portfolios, is independent of the state.
9Consider an economy where only a fraction α<1 of the ﬁr m sc a ns e tt h ep r i c e s
contemporaneously. The remaining ﬁrms are restricted as they cannot revise the
p r i c et h e yc h a r g e .I ft h ep o l i c yi st h eo n es t a t e di nP r o p o s i t i o n2 . 2t h eﬁrms that
can revise the price would choose not do it. The restriction would not be binding.
As prices are identical for every ﬁrm that particular policy would decentralize the
optimal ﬂexible price allocation. This is true for any α, which implies that the
optimal policy is independent of the size of the α. The same reasoning applies to
the other types of frictions. While the degree of rigidity is irrelevant, the type of
rigidity matters, as implied by Proposition 2.2. The following proposition states
these results.





t=0 depends on the type of
friction, but is independent of the extent of the friction measured by α.
We have not been completely explicit about the particular restrictions on the
setting of prices, wages or the decisions on portfolios. The results stated above
hold for many speciﬁcations of these restrictions. In particular, if, for example,
prices are set in a staggered manner, as in Calvo (1987), in order to replicate
the allocation under ﬂexible prices the prices will have to be constant over time.
This is a particular case of state independence of the price sequence that can be
achieved with the policies described in the last section. The nominal interest rate
will move with the real rate and taxes on labor income will adjust to guarantee the
optimal state dependent intra-temporal distortion. The price setting restrictions
could be more complex and still the optimal monetary policy would be the same.
For instance, ﬁrms could be heterogeneous in that a fraction would be setting
prices one period in advance, another fraction would be ﬂexible and the remaining
fraction would be setting prices according to Calvo.
We have simpliﬁed the analysis by assuming that the nominal interest rate does
not generate an additional distortion, as in a model with cash and credit goods
or a transactions technology. In those models, the movements in the nominal
interest rate would be distortionary and therefore under our assumptions on the
ﬁscal instruments it would not be optimal to replicate the ﬂexible price allocation.
Assuming consumption taxes, however, allows to recover the results, as shown in
Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2002).
The policy conclusion of this paper is that economies with diﬀerent αs, i.e. with
diﬀering strengths of the monetary transmission mechanism, but with the same
type of friction, share the same optimal policy in response to aggregate shocks.
This result can be explained using the concept of a gap, deﬁn e di nt h ef o l l o w i n g
10way: Consider an economy with ﬂexible prices and a given ﬁscal and monetary
policy. The same policy in an economy with nominal rigidities will require lump
sum taxes to ﬁnance the budget. The gap is the diﬀerence between the allocations
in the two economies. In response to a technological or government expenditure
shock, the gap is larger the larger is the extent of the stickiness. However the eﬀect
of the policy reaction to those shocks, aiming at closing the gap, is also larger the
larger the extent of the stickiness. We show in this paper that the response of
monetary policy is the same for all levels of stickiness. Monetary policy is the
most eﬀective when it is most necessary.
An empirical implication of the results above is that if policy is conducted
optimally, it is not possible to identify the degree of stickiness from the comove-
ments of aggregate variables. The time series generated by economies with very
diﬀerent levels of nominal rigidities are the same. Thus, the real business cycles
paradigm would be useful to describe the behavior of macroeconomic aggregates,
but not to assess the eﬀects of a monetary policy shock. This may also justify
why the quantitative contribution of the monetary shocks for the explanation of
business cycles is relatively insigniﬁcant, even with microeconomic evidence on
price or wage stickiness.
4. Concluding remarks
The existence of diﬀerent transmission mechanisms has inﬂuenced the discussion
on the costs of a common monetary policy across countries. The ﬁrst step to
understand these costs is to identify whether economies with diﬀerent transmission
mechanisms should follow diﬀerent monetary policy rules. We conclude in this
paper that this may not be the case. Asymmetries in the monetary transmission
mechanisms do not necessarily impose a cost on a common policy.
In economies with frictions, policy shocks will have very diﬀerent eﬀects de-
p e n d i n go nt h et y p ea n ds t r e n g t ho ft h em o n e t a r yt r a n s m i s s i o nm e c h a n i s m .T h e
strength of the transmission mechanism is determined here by the fraction of
agents that are prevented from making choices, on either prices, wages or portfo-
lios, in response to shocks. However, if policy is conducted optimally, so that the
allocation under full ﬂexibility is replicated, the response to common shocks is the
same independently of the strength of the transmission mechanism. A monetary
shock will have a big impact, when a big impact is necessary.
It may not be feasible to replicate the allocation under full ﬂexibility. In
general, monetary policy cannot undo the eﬀects of more than one source of
11frictions. In this case the monetary transmission mechanism is relevant for policy.
But is it really the case that there is such a vast menu of transmission mechanisms
as we commonly see in the policy oriented surveys on this issue?
Other cases in which it is not feasible to replicate the full ﬂexibility allocation
is when shocks are idiosyncratic, for example when the rigidity is on prices and
t h et e c h n o l o g i c a ls h o c k sa r ei d i o s y n c r a t i ca c r o s sﬁrms. To replicate ﬂexible prices,
the relative prices would have to move with the shocks, and monetary policy is
unable to accomplish this.
When monetary and ﬁscal policies are not jointly determined, under general
conditions it is not optimal to replicate the ﬂexible allocation. Also in this case
the transmission mechanism would be relevant in the determination of the optimal
policy.
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